A critical vulnerability in Microsoft Azure‘s application programming interface has exposed virtual private network encryption keys, allowing attackers to infiltrate corporate networks through compromised cloud infrastructure. The flaw implemented VPN connection shared key retrieval as a GET request, bypassing intended security protections and permitting unauthorized access to sensitive pre-shared keys.
The vulnerability exploited over-privileged built-in roles within Azure’s permission structure, granting attackers access to VPN keys through minimal read permissions rather than requiring strict, limited access controls. Microsoft’s classification of 9,618 Azure actions under the broad `*/read` scope created significant potential for accidental secret exposure, illustrating how expansive permission sets can compromise security boundaries. Built-in roles such as Managed Applications Reader were misconfigured with excessive privileges that facilitated unauthorized metadata access across Azure resources.
Attackers utilizing exposed pre-shared keys can establish rogue VPN tunnels, gaining unauthorized entry into internal cloud resources and connected on-premises networks. Hybrid environments face particularly severe risks, as single read-only compromises can escalate to full network infiltration, effectively bypassing traditional network segmentation measures. The attack chain allows lateral movement and privilege escalation within compromised cloud environments, extending threats from cloud infrastructure into corporate networks.
Statistical data highlights the broader threat environment surrounding credential-based vulnerabilities. According to Verizon’s 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report, attacks involving exposed secrets caused 22% of breaches within the past year. Moreover, 28.3% of newly disclosed “known exploited” vulnerabilities experienced attacks within 24 hours of disclosure, as 80% of organizations using cloud platforms suffered at least one breach during the previous year.
Microsoft addressed the vulnerability by updating endpoint permissions to require `Microsoft.Network/connections/sharedKey/action` for VPN key retrieval, rating the flaw as “Important” and awarding the identifying researcher a $7,500 bug bounty. Nevertheless, the company classified the over-privileged role issue as “low severity,” updating documentation rather than immediately restricting permissions. Rather than altering permissions, Microsoft’s updates focus on documentation amendments that do not address the fundamental design flaws in role configuration.
Security experts recommend organizations conduct regular audits of built-in and custom Azure role assignments, implement continuous monitoring for unusual access patterns, and adopt custom roles with minimal necessary permissions to reduce over-privilege risks in cloud environments.
